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Efficient Capital Market Theory, the Market
for Corporate Control, and the Regulation
of Cash Tender Offers
Daniel R. Fischel*
Federal and state regulation of the cash tender offer makes it
dfffcult for outsiders to win control of a corporation whose securi-
ties have been doingpoorly in the capital market. Mr. Fischel ar-
gues that efficient capital market theory undermines the reasons
usually given for these regulatory barriers, and concludes that with-
out these barriers the efficiency of the related market for corporate
control would improve, His discussion also examines the courts' use
of the business judgment rule in cases charging that managers have
improperly dedicated corporate funds to measures that discourage
tender offers, and extolls instead the recently devised compelling
business purpose test, which shifts the burden ofjustfication to de-
fendant managers.
I. Introduction
On the basis of empirical and theoretical work of recent decades,
the thesis that capital markets like those provided by our national stock
exchanges are allocationally efficient has gained increasing support. In
general terms, a capital market is efficient in this sense if the prices of
traded securities accurately and promptly reflect the securities' intrinsic
values relative to all publicly available information, or in other words,
if the market responds immediately to relevant information that any
trader may have and never attaches the wrong evidentiary weight to the
information. One of the factors that will be reflected in the price of a
firm's securities in an efficient capital market is the capability of its
current management. If a firm is poorly managed, the price of its se-
* B.A. 1972, Cornell University; J.D. 1977, University of Chicago.
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curities will be lower than under more competent management, and the
firm and society in general would benefit from a transfer of control to
more capable managers.1 The informational efficiency of a securities
market does not, however, imply the existence of a corresponding mar-
ket for corporate control, a mechanism permitting control to shift from
one group of managers to another group that can employ the assets of a
corporation more profitably.
Corporate control can change hands in several ways, but the most
effective means now available for wresting control from a resisting
management, the means most favored by aggressors, is the cash tender
offer.2 The essence of the cash tender offer is the offeror's public invi-
tation to all shareholders of the target company to tender their shares at
a specified price within a specified time.' The tender offer price will
generally be considerably above the market price of the securities at the
time of the offer. The tender offeror may seek to acquire all the target
company's shares or only a fixed number less than the total amount
outstanding. The offeror is usually willing to pay a premium to acquire
control in the belief that it can manage the target company more effi-
ciently than present management. The cash tender offer thus provides
a mechanism for transfer of control to those who believe they can bet-
ter manage the assets of the corporation. Target managements, how-
ever, frequently resist tender offers because a change in control is likely
to herald a forced change in management. Although the defending
management usually attempts to justify its tactics as being in the best
interests of shareholders, several shareholder suits have recently chal-
lenged management resistance to takeover bids.4
Cash tender offers are subject to pervasive federal and state regu-
lation. Under federal law, the Williams Act5 imposes various filing,
disclosure, and other requirements on tender offerors. The Act also
partially regulates the conduct of target management.6 Approximately
half the states have enacted statutes that supplement the provisions of
1. For an excellent summary of efficient capital market theory and relevant literature, see J.
LORIE & M. HAMILTON, THE STOCK MARKET: THEORIES AND EVIDENCE 70-97 (1973). See also
notes 9-12 infra & accompanying text.
2. P. DAVEY, DEFENSES AGAINST UNNEGOTIATED CASH TENDER OFFERS 1-4 (National
Indus. Conf. Bd. Rep. No. 726, 1977).
3. The application of the term "tender offer" is unsettled. See E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN, &
G. BERLSTEIN, DEVELOPMENTS IN TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 1-35 (1977).
4. For a list of these cases, see Nathan & Kapp, Recent Developments Under the WllliamsAclt
in Takeover andAcquisitions, 9 REV. SEC. REG. 261, 285 (1977).
5. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78g, 1-n, s (1976), as amended by Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977,
Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977).
6: 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(4), (e) (1976).
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the Williams Act.7 Under state common law, directors and officers
owe shareholders a fiduciary duty which further governs the propriety
of management defensive tactics.'
This Article argues that efficient capital market theory undermines
the supposed justification for current tender offer regulation and legal
defensive tactics available to target company management. The Article
further argues that federal and state regulation of cash tender offers
coupled with the defensive tactics available to target management oper-
ate to frustrate the effective functioning of the market for corporate
control to the detriment of all shareholders. Part II introduces the es-
sentials of efficient capital market theory and explains the notion of the
market for corporate control, two topics necessary for a theoretical un-
derstanding of the role of the cash tender offer. The Williams Act and
its effect on cash tender offers are the focus of Part III. Part IV exam-
ines the effect of state tender offer statutes. The array of defensive tac-
tics available to incumbent management are discussed in Part V.
Finally, Part VI proposes a revised standard of fiduciary duty that
management defensive tactics should satisfy.
II. Efficient Capital Market Theory and the Market for Corporate
Control
4. Efficient Capital Market Theory
An efficient capital market9 is one in which a trader cannot im-
7. See notes 89-94 infra & accompanying text.
8. See notes 116-18 infra & accompanying text.
9. Two major implications of efficient capital market theory are that (1) security prices ad-
just rapidly and in an unbiased manner to any new information, and (2) price changes behave in a
random manner. B. LEv, FINANCIAL STATEMENT ANALYSIS: A NEW APPROACH 212 (1974). If
prices of securities did not adjust rapidly and without bias, investors could profit by trading dur-
ing the time during which securities did not reflect all available information or during periods
when the market either overcompensated or undercompensated for new information. Similarly, if
security prices did not move randomly, investors could capitalize on systematic price movements
to earn above average returns.
The empirical support for efficient capital market theory exists in three forms-weak, semi-
strong, and strong. The weak form has focused on the significance of securities' past price move-
ments. Repeated studies have demonstrated that historic patterns of past prices are of no value in
predicting future price movements. The semi-strong form asserts that security prices reflect all
publicly available information about that security. Empirical tests of the semi-strong form have
tested the speed of adjustment of security prices to such events as stock splits, annual earnings
announcements and large secondary offerings of common stock. These tests indicate a quick price
adjustment process in which the information revealed by specific events is anticipated by the
market. The strong form of efficient capital market theory is that even nonpublic information is
quickly reflected in security prices. Tests of the strong form have proven inconclusive. Several
studies of professionally managed mutual funds have concluded that these funds, despite huge
expenditures to identify mispriced securities, were unable to consistently outperform the market.
Other studies have found, however, that corporate insiders can profit by trading on inside infor-
mation not available to other investors.
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prove his overall chances of speculative gain by obtaining public infor-
mation about the companies whose securities are in the market and
evaluating that information intelligently in determining which stocks to
buy and sell. Paradoxically, the efficiency of the market results from
the competitive efforts of securities analysts and investors who strive to
earn superior returns by identifying mispriced securities-securities
that are either overvalued or undervalued. The goal of securities anal-
ysis is to discover information that suggests differences between current
market prices and what these prices "should" be, the securities' intrin-
sic values. The securities analyst acts on this information by buying,
selling, or recommending securities. The process ensures that market
prices reflect all available information. Insider trading-trading by in-
dividuals with access to "inside" or nonpublic information-also con-
tributes to market efficiency. Legal constraints on insider trading
preclude or at least impede insider trading, thereby creating some mar-
ket inefficiency. Nevertheless, in an efficient capital market in which a
large number of buyers and ,ellers react through a market mechanism
such as the New York Stock Exchange to cause market prices to reflect
fully and instantly all available information about a company's securi-
ties, investors should not be able to "beat the market" systematically by
identifying undervalued or overvalued securities.
While efficient capital market theory has many implications for
securities regulation,' 0 including certain aspects of tender offer regula-
tion to be discussed later, my present concern is with its implications
for an allocationally efficient stock market. The efficiency of the securi-
ties markets is typically appraised in terms of both operational and al-
locational efficiency. Operational efficiency refers to the costs of
issuing or transferring securities. These costs include underwriting and
other flotation costs of new issues as well as transaction and regulatory
costs in public transfers of outstanding issues. Allocational efficiency,
generally considered the most important economic goal achieved by
securities markets, refers to the ability of those markets to maintain
equivalent rates of return or costs of financing on comparable invest-
For a survey of the literature on the empirical support for efficient capital market theory, see
J. Lo Ri & M. HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 87-96; Note, The Efficient CapitalMarket Hypothesis,
Economic Theory and the Regulation of the Securities Industry, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1031, 1041-54
(1977).
10. See, e.g., Langbein & Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law, 1976 AM. BAR
FOUNDATION REs. J. I (implications for portfolio theory and duties of a trustee); Langbein &
Posner, Market Funds and Trust-Investment Law II, 1977 AM. BAR FOUNDATION REs. J. I (impli-
cations for portfolio theory and duties of a trustee); Note, The Efficient Capital Market Hypothesis,
supra note 9, at 1069-76 (implications for SEC disclosure requirements and regulation of insider
trading).
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ments with equivalent risks." In an efficient capital market, all infor-
mation about a company's securities is reflected in their price, making
the prices of securities the best available indicators of their value. As
such, "prices are accurate signals for capital allocation."' 2 Companies
whose securities offer the same level of risk have equal access to new
funds at the same costs; more profitable investments are able to bid
investment dollars away from investments offering a lower rate of re-
turn. Differences in return on comparable investments are no more
than those justified by their differences in risk.
B. The Market for Corporate Control
Efficient capital market theory implies that if a publicly traded
company is poorly or less than optimally managed, the price of its se-
curities will reflect this fact accurately and promptly. That a capital
market is efficient, however, does not imply that there is a similarly
efficient mechanism whereby control shifts from less capable managers
to others who can manage corporate assets more profitably. The mar-
ket for corporate control, so called by Henry Manne in his ground-
breaking work on the subject,' 3 must perform that function in our
economic system.
Poor performance of a company's securities in the capital market
is a common indication of poor management. The lower the market
price of the securities compared to what it would be with better man-
agement, the more attractive the firm is to outsiders with the ability to
take the firm over. The most common takeover device is the merger.
This takeover device is not available, however, when incumbent man-
agement opposes the shift in control because merger statutes uniformly
require approval by the directors of the two corporations.' 4 The two
techniques that can be used to shift control when there is opposition are
the direct purchase of shares and the proxy contest.
Direct purchases of shares can be purchases as a result of private
negotiations with large individual shareholders, open market
purchases, or purchases pursuant to a tender offer. The first type of
direct purchase has the advantages of secrecy and price negotiation.
From a practical point of view, this type of direct purchase is highly
11. Friend, The SEC and the Economic Performance of Securities Markets, in ECONOMIC
POLICY AND THE REGULATION OF CORPORATE SECURITIES 190 (H. Manne ed. 1960).
12. E. FAMA, FOUNDATIONS OF FINANCE 133 (1976).
13. E.g., Manne, Cash Tender Offers for Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DUKE
LJ. 231; Manne, Mergers and the Market for Corporate Control, 73 J. POL. ECON. 110 (1965).
14. See, ag., TEX. Bus. CoP. ACT ANN. art. 5.03A (Vernon 1956).
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desirable if there are at most a few controlling shareholders."5 Open
market purchase of shares can also be an effective takeover device.
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 requires, however, that a state-
ment be filed with the Securities Exchange Commission (SEC) within
ten days after the purchase of five percent of any class of equity secur-
ity.' 6 This disclosure will fuel the inevitable rise in market price that
occurs when news spreads that there is a buyer in the market seeking
control, making this form of direct purchase prohibitively expensive if
shares are widely dispersed.
The tender offer is the most advantageous means of acquiring con-
trol if shares are widely held. Unlike open market purchases which
may leave an offeror in a minority position if it acquires insufficient
shares, a tender offer can be conditioned on receiving sufficient shares
for control. The offeror can specify other terms of the offer such as the
offer price, the length of time during which the offer will remain open,
and withdrawal rights. Compensation for tendered shares can either be
cash or a package of securities of the offeror. But a stock tender offer
has significant drawbacks if incumbent management opposes a shift in
control. The Securities Act of 1933 requires that all new securities of-
fered for sale be registered. This registration provides management
with advance warning of any takeover bid and thereby denies the of-
feror the element of surprise generally necessary for a successful tender
offer.17
The alternative way to shift control in the face of hostile manage-
ment is the proxy fight. The expense entailed in the solicitation of
proxies and compliance with SEC disclosure regulations makes waging
a proxy contest extremely costly. While SEC regulations have also
made tender offers more expensive, an important difference still exists.
If an outsider loses a proxy fight, it may have little or nothing to show
for its expenses; a defeated tender offeror, in contrast, will at least own
tendered shares if control is not obtained."8 Finally, the probability of
an outsider's success in a proxy fight is far less than that of his success
15. Several commentators, however, contend that control is a corporate asset and therefore
all shareholders are entitled to share in any premium paid for control. Eg., Jennings, Trading in
Corporate Control, 44 CALIF. L. REv. 1, 9 (1956). This rule would have the undesirable effect of
frustrating shifts in corporate control to individuals who might use their controlling influence to
operate the corporation more efficiently, thereby benefitting all shareholders.
16. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (1970), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 202, 91 Stat. 1494
(1977).
17. If the offeror loses the element of surprise, management has the opportunity to employ a
wide variety of defensive tactics to defeat the tender offer. See Part V infra.
18. The offeror, of course, is free to condition its offer on gaining enough shares to ensure
control.
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in a tender offer because of management's well-known dominance of
the proxy machinery. The superior opportunity presented to a share-
holder in a tender offer-the immediate opportunity to sell his shares
at a premium above market price versus the almost impossible task of
evaluating complex arguments compressed into proxy materi-
als-strongly suggests the superiority of the tender offer as a takeover
device.
C. Characteristics of Target Companies
A key assumption about the market for corporate control is that
outsiders are attracted to firms that are poorly managed. Empirical evi-
dence supports this assumption. Studies designed to uncover the typi-
cal traits of target companies generally conclude that poor management
performance is a common characteristic.19 This conclusion finds cor-
roboration in efficient capital market theory. Because the market
prices of securities faithfully reflect value, other explanations for the
takeover attractiveness of target companies that assume frequent aber-
rations in stock market valuations are suspect.20 While the evidence
19. The result of a detailed study of fifty tender offers over a ten year period, for which the
underlying data was not published, was that "[t]he typical subject company has exhibited disap-
pointing operating performance, paid decreasing dividends and is excessively liquid. In short,
vulnerability to a take-over bid may be traceable to inept, or at least overly-conservative manage-
ment." Taussig & Hayes, Are Cash Takeover Bids Unethical?, 23 FINANCIAL ANALYSTS' J. 107,
108 (1967). A second study also found that target companies do not perform as well as compara-
ble companies in their industries. Austin & Fishman, 7he Tender Take-Over, MERGERS & Ac-
QUISITIONs, May-June 1969, at 4. Focusing on 104 tender offers from 1956 to 1965, this study
revealed that 83.8% of target companies had profit margins equal to or lower than other firms in
their respective industries. Similarly, 86.1% of target companies yielded either no more or even
less to the equity owners than comparable firms. Of all target companies, 65.8% evidenced either
decreasing or steady stock price performance. Other characteristics of the target companies were
below industry performance in sales and earnings, poor dividend policy, book values frequently
above share price, and excessive liquidity. The authors conclude that target firms have been "op-
erating in a retrograde manner relative to their competitors." Id. at 6. One empirical study based
on an examination of eighteen tender offers during the first six months of 1967 reached a contrary
conclusion. Comment, Economic Realities of Cash Tender Offers, 20 ME. L. REV. 237 (1968).
Studies of takeovers in the United Kingdom have been divided on the issue of poor performance
by target companies. Cf. A. SINGH, TAKEOVERS (1971) (finding no high correlation between low
profitability and susceptibility to takeover attempts); D. KUEHN, TAKEOVERS AND THE THEORY
OF THE FIRM 83, 110 (1975) (finding such a correlation).
The thesis that the attractiveness of companies to tender offerors has no correlation with poor
performance but does reflect the market's undervaluing of the companies' securities as reflected in
the securities' low price-earnings ratios is part of the lore advanced by managements that face
unwelcome tender offers. This lore surfaces in works of advice to the threatened managers. See,
eg., P. DAVEY, supra note 3, at 6; Lee, Tender Offer Defenses: How to Short-circuit the Corporate
Raider, MERGERS & AcQuIsITIONs, Fall 1975, at 4, 6.
20. Efficient capital market theory suggests that the poor performance theory of target com-
panies closely approximates reality. In an efficient capital market, disparities between market
price and intrinsic value (the basic predicate of the Maine Law Review study, Comment, supra
note 19) will rarely exist, or more accurately, will rarely be identifiable by investors. A distinction
must be drawn between a firm that is undervalued and one that could be more profitable with
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does not establish that acquisitions or mergers pursuant to tender offers
invariably lead to more profitable performance, the willingness of of-
ferors to pay a premium for control is some assurance that they
strongly anticipate greater profitability.2'
D. A Note on the Separation of Ownership and Control
One of the basic themes of corporation law is the significance for
shareholders of the modem corporation's separation of ownership and
control. In their famous work on this subject, Professors Berle and
Means assumed that managers do not seek to maximize what is most
important to shareholders-appreciation of the shareholders' underly-
ing investment.22
Berle and Means failed to recognize, however, that unity of owner-
ship and control is not a necessary condition of efficient performance
of a firm.' If the owner of a wholly owned firm is its manager, he will
make operating decisions that maximize his utility.24 After the owner-
manager sells equity in the firm to raise capital, however, his incentive
to search out new profitable ventures diminishes because he now bears
only a fraction of the losses resulting from less profitable investments.25
The agency relationship between shareholders and managers inevitably
calls into question the identity of the agent's decisions with decisions
that would maximize the welfare of shareholders.26
Various market mechanisms exist, however, to minimize this di-
vergence of interests between managers and shareholders. As Alchian
has illustrated,27 an architect or builder does not share in its profits or
losses (as only the owners do) absent contractual arrangement. Yet the
architect or builder is vitally interested in the success of the building.
The greater the profits generated by his efforts, the greater the demand
for his services. Corporate managers are in precisely the same situa-
different management. The first situation is highly unlikely in an efficient capital market. But it
is entirely possible that a share price reflects all available information about a company, yet is far
lower than what it would be under different management.
21. See, e.g., P. DAVEY, supra note 2, at 6; Lee, supra note 19, at 4, 6.
22. A. BERLE & G. MEANs, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY (rev. ed.
1968).
23. See, eg., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYsIs OF LAW 301 (2d ed. 1977).
24. Jensen & Meckling, Theory ofthe Fir=" Managerial Behavior: Agency Costs and Owner-
ship Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305, 312 (1976).
25. Similarly, as the owner-manager's share of the equity falls and his fractional claim on the
outcome falls, he will have greater incentives to appropriate larger amounts of corporate resources
in the form of perquisites. Id. at 313.
26. In addition to this inevitable residual loss, other costs of the agency relationship are mon-
itoring expenditures by the principal and bonding expenditures by the agent. Id. at 308.
27. Alchian, Corporate Management and Property Rights, in MANE, supra note 11, at 337,
343-44.
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tion. While they do not directly share in the profits of an enterprise,
successful performance increases the demand for their services as man-
agers. Managers have a further incentive to maximize profit if their
compensation is in some way linked to performance-stock options are
a common example of this type of arrangement. Intensity of competi-
tion in the firm's product market also provides an incentive for mana-
gerial efficiency.2"
The market for corporate control and the threat of cash tender of-
fers in particular are of great importance in creating incentives for
management to maximize the welfare of shareholders. Theoretically,
shareholders may oust poor management on their own initiative, but
the costs to individual shareholders of monitoring management per-
formance and campaigning for its defeat in shareholder elections when
performance is poor are prohibitive. On the other hand, inefficient
performance by management is reflected in share price thus making the
corporation a likely candidate for a takeover bid. Since a successful
takeover bid often results in the displacement of current management,
managers have a strong incentive to operate efficiently and keep share
prices high.
III. The Williams Act
A. Disclosures by the Offeror
Section 13(d) of the Williams Act29 provides that any person who
obtains more than a five percent beneficial interest in a company must
file with the SEC. Under rule 14D-l, 30 any person seeking to make a
tender offer that will result in his becoming the owner of more than five
percent of a class of equity securities must file a schedule 14D-1 1 state-
ment with the SEC. Rule 14D-1 also requires that an offeror make
extensive disclosures to the target company's shareholders. The infor-
mation to be disclosed includes the name and background of the of-
feror (including any criminal convictions within the past five years), the
highs and lows at which the target company's security has been traded
in each quarter during the past two years, the offeror's source of funds,
the offeror's financial condition, and any contracts or negotiations
28. It has been argued that conditions of monopoly in product markets lessen the constraints
on management behavior. See Williamson, Corporate Control and the Theory of the Firm, in
MANE, supra note 11, at 281, 294-95. But see Jensen & Meckling, supra note 24, at 329-30.
29. 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (Supp. V 1975), as amended by Pub. L. No. 95-213, § 202,91 Stat.
1494 (1977).
30. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-1 (1977).
31. 17 C.FR. § 240.14d-100 (1977).
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within the past three years between the target and the offeror concern-
ing a merger or takeover. The offeror must also disclose the purpose of
the tender offer including any plan for a future merger, reorganization,
liquidation, transfer of any material amount of the target's assets, or
any intended change in the existing board of directors or manage-
ment. 2 Moreover, section 14(e), 3 the general antifraud provision of
the Act, has been interpreted to require disclosure of material informa-
tion known to the offeror while the offer remains outstanding, even if
such information was not otherwise required.34 Some commentators
have argued that such diverse items as financial statements of the of-
feror and the basis for setting the tender offer price are material and
should be disclosed to investors.35
Proponents advance three major justifications for these disclosure
requirements: (1) the need to give shareholders parity of information
with the offeror, (2) the anomaly of disclosure requirements in other
control-transfer situations such as the exchange offer and proxy contest
but not the cash tender offer; and (3) protection of the corporation
against corporate raiders. These justifications will now be separately
evaluated.
L Placing shareholders on an equalfooting with offerors.-One of
the leading supporters of the Williams Act has argued in a famous arti-
cle3 6 that disclosures by the offeror are necessary "if public investors
are to stand on an equal footing with the acquiring person in assessing
the future of the company and the value of its shares. '37 The legislative
history of the Act also reflects this concern. 8
The argument has a surface plausibility. Shareholders faced with
a tender offer must decide whether to tender their shares. If they de-
cide to sell, they will no longer have any interest in the company, and
therefore information concerning the background and future plans of
the offeror is irrelevant to them. 9 While shareholders who follow this
32. For a more comprehensive description of required disclosures by a tender offeror in
schedule 14D-1, see Gould & Jacobs, The Practical Effects of State Tender Offer Legislation, 23
N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 399, 410 n.36 (1978).
33. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(e) (1970).
34. See, eg., Sonesta Int'l Hotels Corp. v. Wellington Assocs., 483 F.2d 247, 250 (2d Cir.
1973).
35. E.g., Haft, Disclosure In Cash Tender Offers, 8 REv. SEc. REG. 975 (No. 3 1975).
36. Cohen, A Note on Takeover Bids and Corporate Purchases of Stock, 22 Bus. LAW. 149
(1966).
37. Id. at 150.
38. Eg., H.R. REP. No. 1711,90th Cong., 2d Sess. 3, reprinted in [1968] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2811.
39. A shareholder who has decided to disinvest may nevertheless remain an involuntary in-
Vol. 57:1, 1978
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course receive a premium above market, they relinquish the right to
participate in growth of the company under new management if the
tender offer is successful. Some shareholders, perhaps those who be-
lieve that the offeror would not pay a premium for control unless it
thought it could turn the target around, may prefer not to tender their
shares in order to retain an equity participation after the takeover. Of
course, this strategy requires that not too many shareholders follow it
because the success of the tender offer depends on a sufficient number
of shares being tendered. The risk that the tender offer will fail if not
enough shares are tendered imposes a cost on the shareholder who re-
fuses to tender in hopes of participating in the company under new
management. If the tender offer is defeated, shareholders who refused
to sell lose the premium they could have received had they tendered.
Thus, shareholders must balance the cost of not tendering-the lost
premium of the tender offer price above market-against expected
gains under new management. While shareholders can readily ascer-
tain the cost of not tendering by simply multiplying the premium by the
number of shares they own, the expected gains under new management
are speculative. The rational shareholder in making a decision whether
to tender may well desire such information as the basis for setting the
offer price and any future plans of the offeror.4 Nevertheless, it is
doubtful that the offeror should be required to provide this informa-
tion.
A duty of disclosure is not imposed in all securities transactions.41
Generally, the securities laws impose an affirmative duty of disclosure
only on persons who owe some fiduciary duty to the affected party. As
the SEC stated in Cady, Roberts & Co., the seminal case on insider
trading:
Analytically, the obligation [to disclose material, nonpublic infor-
mation prior to trading] rests on two principal elements; first, the
existence of a relationship giving access, directly or indirectly, to
vestor in the target if the tender offer is oversubscribed and shares are only accepted on a pro rata
basis. Even this risk can be eliminated, however, by selling in the market (although the premium
offered by the offeror may not be available).
40. An example posed by then Chairman Cohen in the Senate Hearings illustrates this di-
lemma. Chairman Cohen posits a situation in which a company's stock is selling for $5 a share
but has a liquidation value of $15 per share. A tender offeror then offers $6 per share. Chairman
Cohen suggests that shareholders cannot make an intelligent decision whether to tender unless
they are informed of the liquidation value of their shares. Once informed, they may well believe
that the $6 offer price is inadequate. See Hearings on S. 510 Before the Subcomnm on Securities of
the Senate Comm on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., Ist Sess. 18 (1967) (testimony of Chair-
man Cohen).
41. See generally Fleischer, Mundheim, & Murphy, An Initial Inquiry Into the Responsibility
to Disclose Market Information, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 798 (1973).
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information intended to be available only for a corporate pur-
pose and not for the personal benefit of anyone, and second, the
inherent unfairness involved where a party takes advantage of
such information knowing it is unavailable to those with whom
he is dealing.42
The typical tender offer situation, however, involves neither of these
two rationales for the duty of disclosure. The offeror is usually an out-
sider with no special relationship to the target and no access to inside
information. In this situation, prior to passage of the Williams Act, the
offeror had no duty to disclose.43
In Mills v. Sarjem Corp.,' for example, an offeror purchased
eighty percent of the shares of a target company that owned bridges.
The offeror at the time of the tender offer planned to sell the bridges to
a municipal authority in exchange for revenue bonds at a substantial
profit. A shareholder then brought an action under rule lob-5 alleging
that the offeror had a duty to disclose its plans to sell the bridges if the
tender offer was successful. Rejecting this contention, the court fo-
cused on the absence of any special relationship between the offeror
and the target:
There seems to be no question but that the sellers and pur-
chasers of the shares of stock dealt at arm's length, and that the
selling shareholders were plainly on notice of the fact that the
purchasing syndicate designed to obtain all of the capital stock of
the corporation. Surely plaintiffs must have anticipated the like-
lihood that the defendants had a profit-making purpose in mind,
especially when the price per share offered to them was substan-
tially higher than the market value of the shares. The entire field
of securities transactions is to some degree speculative in nature,
and sales are usually motivated by a difference in opinion be-
tween vendor and purchaser regarding the future prospects of the
particular security involved. Such was clearly the case here, and
in the absence of any fiduciary duty it was not incumbent upon
the defendants to divulge their plans with respect to a subsequent
resale of the property. 5
Mills and the Williams Act take opposite approaches to the issue
whether a third party, absent a special or fiduciary relationship, has an
obligation to disclose admittedly material information to shareholders.
To decide which represents the preferable approach requires an under-
standing of the economics of information production.
42. Cady, Roberts & Co., 40 S.E.C. 907, 912 (1961) (footnote omitted).
43. See generally Fleischer & Mundheim, Corporate Acquisiltion By Tender Offer, 115 U. PA.
L. REv. 317, 328-35 (1967).
44. 133 F. Supp. 753 (D.NJ. 1955).
45. Id. at 764.
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For the market for corporate control to function effectively, out-
siders must have adequate incentives to produce information.46 Out-
siders are not generally privy to inside information about a potential
target. A decision to tender only occurs after an offeror determines that
the target will be more profitable in its control and that a tender offer is
likely to succeed. These decisions involve research costs. The incentive
to produce this information is the expected gain from the appreciation
of the offeror's equity investment after obtaining control. Any legal
constraint that limits the ability of owners of privately produced infor-
mation to realize its exchange value will discourage devoting resources
to produce new information. In other words, a failure to recognize a
property right in privately produced information will decrease the in-
centives to produce this information.47
Recognition of a property right in information-a right or entitle-
ment to invoke the coercive machinery of the state to exclude others
from its use-is not unusual in the American legal system. The grant-
ing of a patent is a familiar example of a legally enforceable property
right. Another way in which the legal system can grant a property right
in information is by allowing a party who possesses valuable informa-
tion to enter into and enforce contracts without having to disclose the
information to the other party.48 Imposing a duty of disclosure is tan-
tamount to requiring that the benefit of the information be publicly
shared. This requirement of disclosure is antithetical to the basic no-
tion of a property right, which by definition entails the legal protection
of private appropriation for private benefit.49
The disclosure requirements of the Williams Act-justified by a
goal of ensuring parity of information between the offeror and share-
holders-dilute the value of the property right in privately produced
information. Provisions like the filing requirements and requirements
of disclosure of identity and source of funds increase the cost of a
tender offer and thereby diminish takeover incentives. Other provi-
sions such as the requirement of disclosure of intentions have a more
serious impact. This requirement is perhaps the most objectionable
feature of the Williams Act. The securities laws generally impose no
46. See Manne, Cash Tender Offers For Shares-A Reply to Chairman Cohen, 1967 DUKE
LJ. 231, 236.
47. Manning, Discussion & Comments On Papers By Professor Demsetz and Professor
Benston, in MANNE, supra note 11, at 109.
48. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information, and the Law ofContracts, 7 J. LEGAL STuD.
1, 15 (1978).
49. Id.
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corresponding requirement on incumbent management.50 If manage-
ment and another party agree to a merger, for example, there is no duty
to disclose until the agreement is closed. It is highly unlikely that an
outsider will know with any certainty what his future plans are. The
premature and tentative nature of any outsider's plans create great un-
certainty over when such disclosure is required.51 This uncertainty has
resulted in considerable litigation. Indeed, a favored defensive tactic of
management to frustrate a tender offer is to charge that an offeror has
violated the Williams Act by not disclosing its intentions. The cost of
uncertainty is a deterrent to tender offers. More fundamentally, disclo-
sure of intentions forces an offeror to share information that he has
used resources to produce, without receiving any compensation in re-
turn. In other securities transactions, inequalities of bargaining power
attributable to superior intelligence, research, or diligence are not only
permitted but are considered to be integral to a free market economy.52
The law does not require a purchaser of stock in an exchange or over-
the-counter market to inform a seller why he believes the value of stock
is or will be greater than the purchase price despite the fact this infor-
mation would be extremely useful to the seller. Yet a tender offeror
who believes that a company would be more profitable if managed in a
different way, merged, or even liquidated must, under the Williams
Act, disclose his intentions. There is no sound reason why investors
should stand on an "equal footing" in the latter situation but not the
former. A proponent may defend the duty of disclosure for insiders on
the grounds that insiders are likely to acquire information, not by supe-
rior efforts, but by virtue of their superior access.53 Thus, a rule requir-
ing insiders to disclose does not significantly deter the production of
new information.54 But this justification is inapplicable to the typical
tender offeror, and the Williams Act, by imposing on outsiders a quasi-
fiduciary duty of disclosure instead of recognizing a property right in
privately produced information, greatly reduces the incentive to under-
take a takeover attempt.55
50. But see note 104 infra.
51. Incumbent management, which is in a much better position than an outsider to be aware
of its future plans, is under no corresponding disclosure obligation. See Manne, supra note 46, at
250.
52. Brudney, A4 Note On Chilling Tender Solicitations, 21 RuTGEms L. REv. 609, 615 (1967).
53. As Professor Posner has stated, "Insider trading does not reward efficient management as
such. It rewards the possession of confidential information, whether it is favorable or unfavorable
to the corporation's prospects.' See R. POSNER, supra note 23, at 308.
54. Prohibitions on insider trading do, however, cause some market inefficiency by prevent-
ing share prices from reflecting all available information.
55. The distinction in securities law between circumstances in which corporate insiders and
tender offerors, as parties to negotiations with shareholders for the possible sale of securities, have
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The goal of ensuring parity of information between offerors and
shareholders at the expense of recognizing a property right in privately
produced information is also evident in several recent proposals. One
commentator5 6 has argued that section 14(e) of the Williams Act, the
general antifraud section, requires that the offeror disclose "all finan-
cial and business information relating to the target that it has obtained
at any time prior to the making of the offer" even if he obtained this
information "solely from publicly available materials of the target."
Moreover, this commentator urges, the offeror should also be required
to disclose its basis for setting the tender price: "[Sluch disclosure
would elicit a great deal of information about (1) the 'hidden values'
that the target may possess, of which the ordinary target shareholder
may not be aware, and (2) the special values the target has in the of-
feror's hands." 57 It is difficult to conceive of proposals that would have
a more devastating impact on the incentives of an offeror to devote
resources to produce new information. Adoption of these proposals
would effectively cripple the market for corporate control by substan-
tially impairing the ability of the offeror to realize the exchange value
of privately produced information.
2 The '"gap in federal securities law" argument.-A second argu-
ment in justification of the disclosure requirements of the Williams Act
is that disclosure is already required in other takeover devices such as
the proxy contest and the exchange offer.5" The argument overlooks
the fact that other methods of acquiring control that appear to be
closely related to a tender offer, such as a market purchase from a con-
trolling shareholder, are not regulated.
Although various takeover devices share the common objective of
obtaining control, the purposes of disclosure in each of them are not
identical. In a cash tender offer or a proxy contest, for example, insur-
gents are attempting to displace incumbent management. Yet the two
are fundamentally different. In a proxy contest, the parties compete for
the right to manage somebody else's money; in a cash tender offer, by
a duty to disclose information relevant to the shareholders' decisions and circumstances in which
there is no duty of disclosure plays a similar role to the distinction in contract law between circum-
stances in which a seller of goods has a duty to disclose defects in the goods and circumstances in
which there is no duty of disclosure. In a recent article, Professor Kronman has argued that cases
involving contracts impose a duty of disclosure with respect to information the seller might casu-
ally acquire and not with respect to information the seller could acquire only after a deliberate
search. See Kronman, supra note 48. In the tender offer context, insiders typically acquire infor-
mation casually while offerors only do so after a deliberate search.
56. Haft, supra note 35.
57. Id. at 981.
58. See, eg., H.R. REP., supra note 38, at 3.
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contrast, an outsider tries to acquire the right to dictate management
policy by virtue of his own ownership. It would not be illogical to have
a system in which a party striving to manage a corporation as the repre-
sentative of shareholders must make certain disclosures while a party
who wishes to nominate management as a result of majority ownership
or at least working control is free not to disclose.
Nor do disclosures required in exchange offers present a compel-
ling case for disclosures in the cash tender offer context. With respect
to exchange offers in which the stock offered in exchange for shares
tendered must be registered under the Securities Act of 1933, SEC reg-
ulations demand that the registration statement filed in connection with
the exchange disclose similar information about both the offeror and
offeree companies." The theory is that the shareholder must have ade-
quate information about both companies to make an intelligent deci-
sion whether to accept the offered exchange.60 The desirability of this
twofold disclosure requirement, however, is debatable. The rational
shareholder's decision whether to accept the exchange offer will rest on
two factors: (1) the proper valuation of his shares under current man-
agement, and (2) the value of the exchange package securities. Disclo-
sure by the offeror of information about the target company under
current management can only mislead the shareholder/offeree with re-
spect to (1) by placing disproportionate emphasis on aspects of current
target company performance that are already correctly weighed and
reflected in the market price of traded shares. If the exchange package
securities are already publicly traded, the same consideration applies to
them, so that the best information about (2) is also available without
disclosure. If the eventual success of the offeror's management of the
target company will determine the ultimate value of the exchange
package securities, the rational shareholder may need more informa-
tion than market prices afford in order to make his decision, but cur-
rent disclosure requirements answer this need indirectly at best.
Even if it is assumed that disclosure in exchange offers is useful, it
does not follow that disclosure is appropriate in a cash tender offer.
Unlike the shareholder in an exchange offer who is solicited to be both
a buyer and a seller (a seller of his shares in the offeree company and a
buyer in the offeror company), a shareholder in a cash tender offer can
only become a seller. Thus, while the shareholder in a successful ex-
change offer maintains a continuing investment, many shareholders in
a successful cash tender offer disinvest and have no further interest in
59. Form S-I, General Instruction F, Items 6-10, 12.
60. Fleischer & Mundheim, supra note 43, at 348.
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either the offeror or target company. For these shareholders who re-
ceive cash for their shares, any disclosure is irrelevant.61 Shareholders
who refuse a cash tender offer may do so either in order to participate
in the benefits of the company under new management or in order to
defeat the tender offer. These two goals are remarkably like the only
ones available to shareholders in the exchange offer context. Unlike
the exchange offer, the cash tender offer does not succeed or fail ac-
cording to which of these goals shareholders find more attractive.
Thus, even if exchange offer disclosure requirements do ensure that
shareholders receive otherwise unavailable information relevant to
their decisions, the same disclosure requirements may bear no relation
to the decisions of cash tender offerees.
3. The protection against corporate raiders rationale.--In com-
menting on an earlier version of the Williams Act, Senator Harrison
Williams stated:
In recent years we have seen proud old companies reduced
to corporate shells after white-collar pirates have seized control
with funds from sources which are unknown in many cases, then
sold or traded away the best assets, later to split up most of the
loot among themselves ....
The ultimate responsibility for preventing this kind of indus-
trial sabotage lies with the management and the shareholders of
the corporation that is so threatened. But the leniency of our
laws places management and shareholders at a distinct disadvan-
tage in coming to grips with the enemy.62
Although the Williams Act as enacted explicitly disavowed any desire
to discourage tender offers,63 fear of corporate raiders is nevertheless a
theme in the legislative history.' 4
The theme has two components.65 The first is an assumption that
"proud old companies" that have been operating profitably for years
may somehow be turned into "corporate shells" by unscrupulous
"white-collar pirates." There is no empirical support for this suspicion.
Indeed, the existing evidence is precisely to the contrary. The "proud
old companies" that have been targets in cash takeovers have generally
not performed well.66 The second assumption is that outsiders who
61. The shareholder who cashes out tends to receive the present value of his shares under
efficient capital market theory. Equitable considerations would also seem satisfied, since the pre-
mium paid exceeds the present value of the shares.
62. 111 CONG. REc. 8257-58 (Oct. 22, 1965).
63. See, eg., H.R. REP., supra note 38, at 4.
64. See, eg., Hearings, supra note 40, at 43 (remarks of Sen. Kuchel).
65. See generally Taussig & Hayes, supra note 19.
66. See notes 9-10 supra & accompanying text.
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buy control of a company, liquidate all or some of its assets, and then,
in Senator Williams' words, "split up most of the loot among them-
selves," are evil or unethical. While it is understandable that incum-
bent management who have a vested interest in maintaining their
positions could have this view, it has no empirical support and is con-
trary to economic theory. Empirical evidence suggests that only a
small percentage of tender offers are made for the purpose of liquidat-
ing the assets of the target.67 Moreover, tender offers that are made for
this purpose should not necessarily be discouraged. If the liquidation
value of an enterprise is greater than its going concern value, the tender
offeror renders an economic benefit by liquidating its assets. As long
as the tender offeror does not take more than its pro rata share of the
liquidation value, all shareholders benefit by liquidation.
Even if it is conceded that corporate raiders pose a real danger, it
is still questionable whether the Williams Act is the right solution.
Once a tender offeror gains control, fiduciary duties under state law
preclude looting or other appropriation of corporate assets. While legal
constraints against looting may not be totally effective against deterring
such conduct, it is not clear how much incremental deterrent effect pro-
phylactic disclosure requirements of identity and background have on
unscrupulous offerors. Moreover, whatever deterrent effect on looters
these disclosure requirements have must be balanced against the deter-
rent effect of disclosure requirements on bona fide tender offers that
benefit all shareholders. Because there is no evidence to suggest that a
significant number of tender offerors are looters, the benefits of in-
creased protection that disclosure requirements provide against poten-
tial raiders is outweighed by the costs of their perpetuation, of
inefficient management.
B. Other Obligations of the Offeror Under the Williams Act
The Williams Act also contains several provisions designed to pre-
vent hasty, ill-considered decisions by shareholders of the target corpo-
ration and to ensure that they receive equal treatment. Section
14(d)(5)68 of the Act provides that shareholders must have the right to
withdraw shares tendered within seven days of the time the tender offer
is first published.69 Section 14(d)(6)71 requires the pro rata acceptance
67. Taussig & Hayes, supra note 19, at 110.
68. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(5) (1970).
69. Offerors must also grant shareholders the right to withdraw shares tendered after the
expiration of 60 days from the date of the original offer if the tendered shares have not yet been
paid for by the offeror.
70. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(6) (1970).
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of securities tendered within ten days of a tender offer for less than all
of the outstanding shares of a class of stock of a target company. Sec-
tion 14(d)(7) 71 entitles all shareholders to any increase in price in the
original offer. Thus, if the offeror increases the consideration to be
paid for tendered securities during the course of the offer, it must also
pay the increased price to security holders who tendered at a lower
price before the announcement of the increase, regardless of whether
the securities previously tendered were actually purchased before or af-
ter the announcement.
All these provisions increase the cost of conducting a tender offer.
Section 14(d)(7), which requires an offeror to pay any increase in the
tender offer price to all shareholders, is by far the least justifiable of the
nondisclosure requirements of the Williams Act. Enacted to "assure
fair treatment of those persons who tender their shares at the beginning
of the tender period, and to assure equality of treatment among all
shareholders who tender their shares," 72 section 14(d)(7) imposes a
duty on offerors that would not otherwise be implied. In certain situa-
tions, because of a fiduciary relationship, the Act imposes a duty to
deal fairly and equally with all shareholders. Directors, for example,
cannot selectively declare a dividend payable to some shareholders but
not to others of the same class. It is highly doubtful, however, whether
it is appropriate to impose this duty of equal treatment in the tender
offer context. In other instances of market purchase of shares, no simi-
lar duty is imposed. If a purchaser accumulates a large block of stock
in the open market, nobody could seriously contend that all sellers are
entitled to the highest price paid by the purchaser to any seller.
A tender offeror may decide to increase the price offered after it
becomes clear that the initial price was insufficient to attract the de-
sired number of shares. This procedure is perfectly compatible with a
free niarket economy in which sellers value their securities differently
and, therefore, every increment in price will attract more willing sellers.
Section 14(d)(7) forces an offeror to pay to all shareholders the highest
price that any shareholder demands in order to attain the desired
number of shares even though many shareholders would have sold for
far less.73 The result is to increase greatly the cost of a tender offer.
71. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(d)(7) (1970).
72. H.R. REP., supra note 38, at 11.
73. Rule lOb-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13 (1978), embodies a similar philosophy of equal
treatment of shareholders. The rule prohibits an offeror from purchasing securities that are the
subject of a tender offer on terms other than those of the tender offer regardless of whether share-
holders are willing to sell. This rule can affect an offeror adversely, particularly if a third party is
competing with the offeror for target shares. In some cases, offerors have been precluded by rule
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The withdrawal and pro rata provisions also impose additional
costs. Section 14(d)(5), by giving shareholders an unconditional right
to withdraw during the first seven days of a tender offer, essentially
allows shareholders a put without any return compensation. If the
market price does not rise above the tender price, a shareholder will
have no reason to withdraw his tender. But if the market price rises
above the tender price or if a competing offer develops at a higher
price, the shareholder can withdraw. The withdrawal provisions can
result in an inadequate number of shares being tendered and thus force
the tender offeror to increase the tender price even though an adequate
number were originally deposited.
The pro rata provisions- embodied in section 14(d)(6) give share-
holders an incentive to adopt a "wait and see" attitude during the first
ten days of a tender offer. If tender offerors could purchase on a first-
come-first-serve basis, shareholders would have a much greater incen-
tive to tender early. This delay in tendering decreases the likelihood of
a successful tender offer by providing management with an opportunity
to marshal its resources and engage in a variety of defensive tactics to
frustrate the tender offer.
It may be argued, however, that the withdrawal and pro rata pro-
visions benefit shareholders by providing them with additional time to
respond to a tender offer. During this additional time, competing of-
fers may be made at a higher price than the original tender offer.
Whether shareholders benefit more under a system most favorable to
the original offeror--one with no withdrawal or pro rata provi-
sions--or under a system in which the presence of these provisions en-
courages competing bids is an empirical question not subject to an
armchair resolution. However, it should be noted that competing offers
would develop even if tender offers were unregulated. Presumably,
shareholders faced with a tender offer are not totally ignorant of the
possibility of a competing offer and therefore will not rush to tender
their shares immediately. Even if the shareholders themselves are not
aware of a competing offer, it is in the interest of parties interested in
making a competing offer to make their intentions known as soon as
possible after the original tender offer.
10b-13 from purchasing shares at a price higher than the tender offer price to match the price
being offered in open market purchases by a third party. See Einhorn & Blackburn, The Develop-
ing Concept of "Tender Offer' An Anaysis of the Judicial andAdministrative Interpretations of the
Term, 23 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 379, 393 (1978).
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C. The Types of Transactions That Are Governed By the Williams
Act
A tender offer is generally understood to be a public invitation to
all shareholders of a corporation to tender their shares at a specified
price. The Williams Act, however, nowhere defines "tender offer." As
a general rule, courts have refused to extend the Williams Act require-
ments to market transactions that do not fit the paradigm of the con-
ventional tender offer.74  Several commentators, 75 however, have
argued that a greater range of transactions should be regulated by the
Williams Act. One commentator, for example, has advocated that the
Williams Act should apply to all purchases "found capable of exerting
the same sort of pressure on shareholders to make uninformed, ill-con-
sidered decisions to sell which Congress found the conventional tender
offer was capable of exerting." 76 To determine whether a transaction
should be regulated as a tender offer, the author suggests that courts
examine "the shareholder impact of particular methods of securities
acquisition." 77 Such elements as time limits, premium prices, or speci-
fication of the number of shares to be purchased would indicate that
the shareholder impact of the offer is comparable to that of a conven-
tional tender offer.
This proposed shareholder impact test, however, is fraught with
uncertainty and therefore would further hamper the operation of the
market for corporate control. Under the shareholder impact test, an
offeror does not know in advance whether an offer will be subject to
Williams Act regulations. Thus an offeror cannot be sure whether it is
under a duty to disclose and whether the offer is subject to the match-
ing price, withdrawal, and pro rata provisions of the Williams Act.
This uncertainty inevitably has a chilling effect on attempts to gain
control.
More fundamentally, it is not clear precisely what evils would be
redressed by expanding the definition of tender offer. A third party's
offer to purchase securities, even if qualified by a time limit or accom-
panied by publicity, does not force shareholders to make uninformed,
ill-considered decisions any more than the typical market transaction.
74. See generally id.
75. See, e.g., Moylan, Exploring the Tender Offer Provisions ofthe Federal SecuritiesLaws, 43
GEO. WASH. L. Rv. 551 (1975); Note, The Developing Meaning of "Tender Offer" Under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 86 HIv. L. Rnv. 1250 (1973).
76. See Note, supra note 75, at 1275.
77. Id.
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Only under the most paternalistic view of the securities markets should
all forms of market transactions be regulated to protect shareholders.
Other commentators have argued that pre-tender offer purchases
of securities by an offeror should be subject to Williams Act require-
ments. 78 An offeror frequently purchases shares in the open market or
in privately negotiated transactions before making a formal tender of-
fer. Shareholders who sell during this period are not entitled under
present law to Williams Act protections. Nevertheless, it has been sug-
gested that pre-tender offer purchases should be regulated as tender
offers to prevent the offeror from getting a free ride at the expense of
early purchasers. Similarly, some commentators79 have urged that an
offeror should not be permitted to purchase shares in the market after a
tender offer has terminated. The concern appears to be that the offeror
should not be allowed to take advantage of unsettled conditions after a
tender offer and purchase shares below the tender price. Responding
to this concern, the SEC has proposed a rule that would require that
purchases-made by an offeror within forty days after termination of an
offer be integrated with the original tender offer.8"
The suggestions that pre- and post-tender offer purchases of secur-
ities by an offeror be regulated as tender offers represent a considerable
extension of the Williams Act's policy of equality of treatment among
shareholders. There is simply no reason why, in a free market econ-
omy, all shareholders must be treated equally in this respect. Offerors
should be allowed to contract freely with shareholders for the sale of
their shares at prices and terms satisfactory to the parties. Moreover,
like the Williams Act itself, these proposals focus on the treatment of
target shareholders without adequately considering the effect on the of-
feror. Each extension of the Williams Act lessens the offerors' incen-
tive to try for control. In sum, the adverse effects of the Williams Act
on the market for corporate control should not be increased by regulat-
ing pre- and post-tender offer purchases of securities as tender offers.
_D. Regulation of Disclosures by Management
Pursuant to its rulemaking powers, the Commission has promul-
gated rule 14d-4,8 1 which requires target management to file a schedule
14D statement if it recommends shareholders accept or reject a tender
78. See, eg., Lipton, Book Review, 72 MICH. L. REv. 358, 362-63 (1973).
79. See, e.g., Black & Sparks, Triggering the WlliamsnAct, 8 REv. SEC. REG. 967, 970 (1975).
80. Proposed Rule 14d-6(a), SEC Exchange Act Release No. 34-12676, 2 FED. SEC. L. RE.
(CCH) I 24,286A (Aug. 2, 1976).
81. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14d-4 (1977).
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offer. The 14D statement, much of which must be summarized in any
communication sent to shareholders, requires management to disclose
its reasons for the recommendation. Moreover, any management rec-
ommendation or other disclosure is subject to the anti-fraud rules of
section 14(e).
These regulations of management recommendations conceivably
could serve a salutary function by deterring unsubstantiated claims by
management calculated to frustrate a tender offer, although enforce-
ment of fiduciary duties under state law could also perform this func-
tion. Unfortunately, judicial interpretation has somewhat limited the
utility of these provisions of the Act. In 6uf& Western Industries, Inc.
v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 2 for example, target management was al-
leged to have violated section 14(e) by urging shareholders to reject a
tender offer because the price was too low, without disclosing any basis
for this conclusion. An efficient capital market makes it highly un-
likely that the market price of the target shares is too low. Thus, a
tender offer price above market price will rarely be inadequate, and a
statement to the contrary by management without any basis would
seem to be a misleading statement within the meaning of section 14(e).
Nevertheless, the court held that the statement was not unlawful, em-
phasizing that the "term 'inadequate' when used in connection with the
price of a stock is a highly subjective one," and that stock prices are
determined by "the whims and caprice of the crowd"83 as well as by
objective criteria. The target management statements involved in Guf
& Western are precisely the type of recommendations which should be
prohibited by section 14(e).
The efficacy of Williams Act regulation of management disclo-
sures has been further weakened by the Supreme Court's recent deci-
sion in Pier v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc. 14 Holding that a defeated
tender offeror had no implied right of action under section 14(e) to sue
target management or a competing offeror for damages, the court rea-
soned that because the Act was intended to protect ordinary sharehold-
ers, tender offerors should not be allowed an implied right of action
even if they held stock in the target company. The problem with this
reasoning, however, is that an offeror has both superior access to infor-
mation about section 14(e) violations by management and greater in-
centives to discover them than does a shareholder. Chris-Craft will
reduce significantly section 14(e)'s deterrence of management misrep-
82. 356 F. Supp. 1066 (S.D.N.Y.), af'd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d Cir. 1973).
83. .d. at 1071.
84. 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
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resentations. 85
E. Whether the Williams Act Should Be Amended to Impose an
Affirmative Duty of Disclosure on Management
The Williams Act does not impose any affirmative disclosure obli-
gation on a management team confronted by a tender offer. Commen-
tators are almost unanimous in urging that such an affirmative duty
should exist.86 Aside from the uncritical advocacy of many for more
disclosure, it is unclear what benefit would flow from an affirmative
duty of disclosure by management.
Presumably, disclosure is mandatory because management is in
the best position to possess information about the target company that
is relevant to shareholders in deciding whether to tender. Such infor-
mation could consist of an explanation of disappointing operating per-
formance or a future plan to generate increased earnings. While
management undoubtedly has superior access to this type of informa-
tion, it does not follow that management should have an affirmative
disclosure obligation. Under efficient capital market theory, much of
this information is reflected in the market price of the target's securi-
ties. Thus, shareholders need information concerning the target only if
this information is not already reflected in the market price of the tar-
get's securities. It is conceivable that management will possess inside
information not reflected in security prices primarily because of
prohibitions against insider trading. Efficient capital market theory,
however, suggests that this situation is relatively rare. Moreover, any
gains from disclosure of inside information that would otherwise not be
made public absent an affirmative disclosure obligation do not out-
weigh the harm to shareholders that would result from self-serving dis-
closures of management designed to defeat a tender offer.
F. The Williams Act: An Appraisal
The legislative history of the Williams Act87 and leading cases88
unequivocally state that the Act was intended to protect shareholders.
85. It is not clear that Chris-Craft will prevent tender offerors from quietly inducing friendly
shareholders of the target company from bringing suit on section 14(e) violations and others so as
to accomplish the same ends as a suit by the tender offer. See 430 U.S. at 42 n.28.
86. E.g., Krasik, Tender Offers: The Target Company's Duty of Disclosure, 25 Bus. LAW. 455
(1970); Note, A Proposalfor ,4ffrmative Disclosure By Target Management During Tender Offers,
75 COLuM. L. REv. 190 (1975).
87. See, eg., note 38 supra.
88. Eg., Piper v. Chris-Craft Industries, Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977); Rondeau v. Mosinee Paper
Corp., 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
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Whether the Williams Act achieves this result, however, is far from
obvious. The greatest risk for a shareholder facing a tender offer is that
he will sell his shares for an inadequate price. The term "inadequate,"
however, has two distinct meanings in this context. First, the tender
price is inadequate if it is less than the intrinsic value of the shares at
the time of sale. Presumably, management exhortations that the tender
price is inadequate and that the offeror is trying to gain control at "bar-
gain basement" prices have this type of situation in mind. Second, a
tender price could be inadequate if the shareholder could somehow re-
ceive a still higher price even though the tender price exceeds the value
of the target securities. This situation could occur, for example, if the
value of the target securities would appreciate under new management,
if the tender offeror increased the tender price, or if a competing tender
offer developed.
The Williams Act tender offer provisions are not primarily con-
cerned with inadequacy of price in the first sense. The required disclo-
sures by the offeror relate to the offeror and its future plans, not to
relevant information about the target. Management, which is in the
best position to appraise whether the market price of the target's shares
approximates their intrinsic value, is under no duty to disclose. More-
over, as should now be clear, in an efficient capital market at equilib-
rium there is little danger that shareholders will get less than their
shares are worth if they receive a premium above market.
Much of the Williams Act, therefore, is designed to prevent share-
holders from receiving an inadequate price in the second sense. Disclo-
sure of the offeror's future plans may alert the shareholder that his
shares will be worth more under new management; the requirement
that the offeror retroactively grant any increase in price to all share-
holders ensures that shareholders who tender early will not be
prejudiced; the pro rata provisions protect shareholders who wait on
the sidelines for a counter-offer against the risk that the offeror will
satisfy its needs from other willing shareholders. On their face, these
provisions purport to protect shareholders. Two questions nevertheless
remain-whether protection of shareholders in this manner is an ap-
propriate goal of securities regulation, and whether the costs imposed
by this type of regulation outweigh other benefits to shareholders in an
unregulated market.
The securities laws generally impose a duty of disclosure and fair
dealing on insiders or other parties with access to inside information.
But the securities laws have never been interpreted to mandate full dis-
closure and egalitarianism in all market transactions. In a typical se-
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curities transaction, a buyer does not have to disclose why he thinks the
stock is worth more than his offer price, pay all sellers the same for
their shares if some are willing to sell for less than others, or give all
shareholders an equal opportunity to sell. Yet these are the require-
ments imposed on a tender offeror by the Williams Act. The Act
stands alone among major pieces of securities regulation in imposing a
quasi-fiduciary duty on a buyer in a securities transaction absent any
fiduciary or special relationship.
Even if the Williams Act conformed with the goals of securities
regulation, there remains the question whether the costs generated by
the Act outweigh any benefit to shareholders. The existence of a take-
over device such as the cash tender offer provides a mechanism for
shifting control to those who can manage assets more effectively. The
possibility that control could change hands gives incumbent manage-
ment an incentive to perform efficiently and keep stock prices high in
the interest of all shareholders. By increasing the cost of making a
tender offer and by reducing the exchange value of privately produced
information, the Williams Act limits the effectiveness of cash tender
offers and thereby undermines a check against entrenched inefficient
management to the detriment of current shareholders.
IV. State Takeover Statutes
A. State Statutory proviSiOns89
State tender offer statutes regulate tender offers when a target cor-
poration has certain contacts with the state. Whether a target corpora-
tion is protected typically depends on such factors as (1) incorporation
within the state, (2) principal place of business in the state, (3) substan-
tial assets in the state, and (4) percentage of the corporation's total em-
ployees within the state.90 In some states offerors who acquire more
than a specified percentage of a class of stock of a target company and
then intend to make a tender offer must file a form similar to a registra-
tion statement with both the state securities commission and the target
within some prescribed period between ten and sixty days prior to the
effective date of the offer.91 Many states also require public disclosure
at the time of the filing.92 Disclosures under state statutes are usually
89. This subsection is based primarily on E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN, & G. BERLSTEIN, sUPra
note 3, at 207-17.
90. Id. at 208.
91. Thirty states regulate tender offers in this manner. Id at 212 & nn.44-46.
92. Id. at 212 & nA3.
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considerably more extensive than under the Williams Act.93 State
tender offer statutes also usually provide a minimum period during
which an offer must remain open and a period during which sharehold-
ers can withdraw any tendered shares. Most also contain pro rata
purchase provisions in the event the tender offer price is increased. Fi-
nally, some states monitor the terms of an offer by requiring that it be
"fair and equitable."94
To enforce compliance, virtually all state tender offer statutes pro-
vide that a hearing concerning the tender offer must be held if re-
quested by the state securities commission or, in several states, by the
target company. The purpose of the hearing is to determine whether
the state statute has been complied with. If a tender offer does not
comply with the state statute, the commissioner can usually sue in state
court to enjoin the offer. Most state statutes also make an offeror liable
in damages and even criminally liable for violations.
B. Effect of State Tender Offer Statutes
Like the Williams Act, state tender offer statutes are ostensibly in-
tended to protect shareholders. It is difficult, however, to perceive how
shareholders could benefit from them. State tender offer statutes share
many of the shortcomings of the Williams Act. Disclosure provisions,
typically more burdensome than corresponding provisions under the
Williams Act, significantly increase the cost of using the tender offer
and decrease the incentive to produce information. Expanded disclo-
sure requirements under state law also provide target management with
increased opportunities to embroil offerors in protracted and expensive
litigation that reduces the likelihood of a tender offer's success. Simi-
larly, the withdrawal, pro rata, and matching price provisions of state
statutes suffer from the same deficiences as comparable provisions of
the Williams Act.
In one major respect, state tender offer statutes go far beyond the
Williams Act in regulating offerors. In most states, the requirement of
a filing by the offeror with the state securities commissioner and the
target between ten and sixty days prior to the effective date of the offer
eliminates the element of surprise so crucial for success. The possibility
that the commissioner or the target may demand a hearing to deter-
mine whether the tender offer is in compliance with state law increases
the likelihood of delay. The pre-offer filing and hearing provisions of
93. Id. at 212-13.
94. Id. at 213-16.
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state statutes provide target management with advance warning of fu-
ture offers and time to attempt to defeat the offer.95
During the period between the initial filing and the effective date
of the offer, target management can actively lobby against the prospec-
tive offer and undertake various defensive tactics designed to frustrate
the pending tender offer. During this period, however, the offeror is
generally prohibited from communicating with shareholders. The in-
evitable result of the prefiling and hearing provision is to make it more
difficult for a tender offer to succeed. Thus, state tender offer statutes,
even more than the Williams Act, pose a powerful threat to the opera-
tion of the market for corporate control.96
C. State Tender Offer Statutes and the Competition for Corfporate
Charters
In an important article, Professor Ralph Winter has demonstrated
the importance of the competition for corporate charters in protecting
the interests of shareholders.97 If a state corporation code allowed
management to profit at the expense of shareholders or otherwise failed
adequately to protect shareholders' investment interest, shares of cor-
porations chartered in such states would trade at lower prices than
shares of comparable companies in other states. Indeed, this result is
inevitable in an efficient capital market. Corporations that trade at de-
pressed prices are at a disadvantage in competing for debt and equity
capital and become likely candidates for a tender offer bid. The possi-
bility of this scenario gives management an incentive to incorporate in
a state with a corporation statute that allows the corporation to com-
pete effectively in the capital markets. To facilitate this result, "[s]tates
95. The impact of delay is particularly great on the arbitrageurs who are generally considered
crucial to a successful tender offer. Arbitrageurs typically purchase shares in the open market
after a tender offer is announced at less than the tender offer price. If the tender offer is success-
ful, the arbitraguers profit by tendering their newly purchases shares at the higher tender price.
The delay resulting from state tender offer statutes increases both the period during which the
arbitrageurs must hold shares and the risk that the tender offer might be enjoined or otherwise
fail. The likely result is that arbitrageurs will purchase fewer shares. See Gould & Jacobs, supra
note 32, at 419.
96. Given their extraterritorial effect, it is possible that state tender offer statutes pose an
unreasonable burden on interstate commerce and are therefore unconstitutional. Another possi-
bility is that these statutes are preempted by the Williams Act. See, e.g., E. ARANOW, H. EIN-
HORN, & G. BERLsTEiN, supra note 3, at 225-32; Langevoort, State Tender-Offer Legislation:
Interests, Effects, andPolitical Competency, 62 CORNELL L. Rlv. 213, 241-54 (1977). For a recent
case declaring Idaho's tender offer statute preempted by the Williams Act, see Great Western
United Corp. v. Kidwell, 577 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. granted, 47 U.S.L.W. 3450 (Jan. 9,
1979).
97. Winter, State Law, Shareholder Protection, and the Theory of the Corporation, 6 J. LEGAL
STUD. 251 (1977).
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seeking corporate charters will try to provide legal systems that opti-
mize the shareholders-corporation relationship.""8
Since state tender offer statutes make tender offers more difficult
and thereby decrease managerial incentives to maximize earnings, a
corporation with the requisite relationship to a state that has this kind
of statute will find it more difficult to raise capital. Nevertheless, as
Professor Winter demonstrates, competition for corporate charters does
not necessarily guarantee that corporations gravitate to states without
tender offer statutes, because these statutes adversely affect the market
for corporate control.
The advantage to a corporation of incorporating in a state without
a state tender offer statute is that the corporation will be a more attrac-
tive investment opportunity and therefore will be able to compete more
effectively in the capital market. While it is usually in the interest of
management to operate in a legal environment conducive to success in
the capital market, state tender offer statutes present a special case.
Shareholders benefit if the corporation is not subject to a state tender
offer statute. Management, however, has a conflict of interest since the
very factor that benefits shareholders-an unhampered market for cor-
porate control-also makes it more likely that management will lose
their jobs. Management may well view the danger of losing their jobs
as greater than any danger that will result from being subject to a state
tender offer statute. In this event, it will not try to avoid the reach of
state tender offer statutes despite the detrimental effect of these statutes
on shareholders.
The extraterritorial effect of state tender offer statutes also ham-
pers the effectiveness of competition for corporate charters. For this
competition to be effective, corporations must be able to incorporate in
states that optimize management-shareholder relationships. But the
importance of incorporation is greatly diluted because the operation of
these tender offer statutes is not triggered only by incorporation. In
many states, percentage of assets or employees within a state, principal
place of business within a state, as well as place of incorporation deter-
mine whether a corporation has sufficient contacts with a state to acti-
vate its tender offer statute. Since a corporation may be subject to the
tender offer statutes of several states even if incorporated in a state with
no such statute, it is far more difficult for states to compete for corpo-
rate charters by not having tender offer statutes.
98. Id. at 256.
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V. Defensive Tactics Employed By Incumbent Management
In addition to the deterrent effect of the Williams Act and state
tender offer statutes, defensive tactics utilized by management make
successful consummation of a tender offer difficult. Defensive tactics
fall into two basic categories: preventive measures taken to make a tar-
get corporation less attractive to a potential offeror and remedial de-
vices undertaken to defeat an offer after it is made.99
A. Preventive Defensive Tactics
The purpose of preventive defensive tactics is to make a target less
attractive to potential offerors. One way of achieving this objective is
to adopt contractual provisions that depend on the continuation of tar-
get management. Such provisions can provide, for example, that loans
from creditors will mature or obligations to bondholders will be in de-
fault if control shifts. Obviously, these contractual obstacles discourage
tender offers.
A second major preventive tactic is the enactment of defensive
charter or bylaw amendments. These amendments may provide for
staggered directorships or the elimination of cumulative voting. Other
possibilities include provisions limiting the total number of directors or
the authority of shareholders to remove directors before the expiration
of their terms. A related type of defensive amendment requires that
standby successor directors be elected at the same time as the regular
directors and that any vacancies that develop be filled by the standby
directors.
One of the most popular defensive charter amendments is the es-
tablishment of supermajority approval requirements for any proposed
merger or sale of assets involving the target and an offeror. Typically,
supermajority provisions provide that any merger involving the target
and any corporation owning a certain percentage of target stock (usu-
ally five or ten percent) must be approved by eighty or eighty-five per-
cent of all shareholders. Mergers or sales of assets not involving a
corporation that owns the specified percentage of target stock are not
subject to the supermajority requirements.
These defensive charter amendments seem repugnant to the most
basic principles of corporate democracy. Provisions that make it diffi-
cult, if not impossible, for a successful offeror to remove directors and
substitute its own nominees allow management to perpetuate itself in
99. See notes 90-94 supra.
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office even when management has lost the support of shareholders.' °°
Since successful offerors may wish to replace inefficient incumbent
management with management of their own choosing to improve per-
formance, these defensive charter provisions discourage tender offers.
Supermajority requirements appear to be similarly reprehensible. Of-
ferors will frequently attempt to gain control of a target before effectu-
ating a merger because a merger requires approval by the board of
directors. If target management opposes a merger, it can often only be
accomplished if a tender offer is first attempted. If a small minority of
shareholders can block a merger, the gains to be expected from a suc-
cessful tender offer and the incentive to tender are reduced.' 0 '
Given the constraints that charter and bylaw amendments place
on the ability of shareholders to sell their shares at a premium, why do
shareholders vote for them? Theoretically, shares of a corporation that
has adopted this kind of amendment should trade for less than shares
of an identical corporation without them. One possible explanation for
this apparent irrationality on the part of shareholders is transaction
costs. If the decline in the value of a corporation's shares is miniscule
and the transaction costs associated with wading through proxy materi-
als high, shareholders may be unwilling to take the time to digest the
proposals in proxy materials. 02 A second possible explanation for
shareholders' approval of charter amendments is deficiencies in disclo-
sure.10 3 Management statements to shareholders in proxy materials to
100. F ARANOW, H. EINHORN, & G. BERLSTEIN, supa note 3, at 195.
101. The establishment of fair price provisions in charter or bylaw amendments also decreases
the incentive to tender. These provisions typically set a minimum price at which controlling
shareholders may buy out or squeeze out minority shareholders. E. ARANOW, H. EINHORN, & G.
BERLSTErN, supra note 3, at 196. Like supermajority requirements, fair price provisions reduce
the benefit to an offeror of a successful tender offer.
102. Under this theory, the large institutional investors are more likely to vote against defen-
sive charter and bylaw amendments than smaller investors. While the decline in share price re-
sulting from the adoption of defensive amendments has a greater effect on large investors with
more shares, the costs associated with digesting proxy materials are equal for both types of inves-
tors. Thus, larger investors have a greater incentive to analyze proxy materials.
103. The "deficiencies in disclosure" explanation is not entirely persuasive. In an efficient
capital market, investors should be able to recognize deficiencies in disclosure despite inadequate
disclosure. Nevertheless, inadequate disclosure may mislead some investors, particularly if man-
agement has inside information of an imminent tender offer. In this event, management has in-
side information that would not necessarily be reflected in share prices, even in an efficient capital
market, and that it should have a fiduciary duty to disclose. See, e.g., United States Smelting,
Refining & Mining Co. v. Clevite Corp. [1969-70 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC. L. REP. (CCH) 1
92,691 (N.D. Ohio 1968). But see A & K Railroad Materials v. Green Bay & W.R. Co., 437 F.
Supp. 636 (E.D. Wis. 1977).
Requiring disclosure in this context has none of the disadvantages of the Williams Act disclo-
sure requirements. Management, unlike an offeror, is an insider with a fiduciary duty to its share-
holders. Moreover, management, unlike the offeror, will not typically have expended funds to
develop information for which it should be entitled to a property right.
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persuade them to approve defensive amendments typically emphasize
the advantages of stable and continuous management and omit any
mention of management's purpose to perpetuate itself in office. In-
cumbent management may also state that defensive amendments dis-
courage outsiders from making surprise attempts to gain control to the
corporation's disadvantage, and prevent outsiders from making funda-
mental corporate changes without approval by a high percentage of
shareholders. Attempts by shareholders to challenge management dis-
closures under rule 14a-9, which forbids false or misleading statements
or omissions of material facts, have generally been unsuccessful. 104
Both the transaction costs and deficiencies in disclosure explana-
tions assume that defensive charter or bylaw amendments do not bene-
fit shareholders. An alternative explanation, however, is that these
amendments are somehow in the interests of shareholders. The inter-
ests are obvious if shareholders are connected in some way with the
management group. Defensive charter amendments also allow share-
holders, because of attachment to management for whatever reason, to
provide management with what is tantamount to a long-term contract
enforceable by specific performance.
B. Remedial Tactics
The pro rata purchase and matching price provisions of the Wil-
liams Act give shareholders an incentive to delay tendering their
shares. The withdrawal provisions allow shareholders who have ten-
dered an opportunity to reconsider. During the time when sharehold-
ers are considering whether to tender or withdraw, target management
has an arsenal of defensive tactics at its disposal to attempt to defeat
the offer. The efficacy of these defensive tactics is indicated by a recent
104. In Elgin Nat'l Indus., Inc. v. Chemetian Corp., 299 F. Supp. 367 (D. Del. 1969), for
example, the court rejected a claim that the failure by management to disclose in a proxy solicita-
tion that the effect of defensive amendments would be to entrench and perpetuate management's
control violated rule 14a-9.
Rowland Cook, chief of the SEC's office of disclosure policy, recently announced, however,
that the SEC staff will review proxy materials closely to make sure that management makes ade-
quate disclosure of proposals designed to ward off takeover attempts.
According to the staff, companies should disclose, among other things:
-The reasons for the proposal. If management knows of specific takeover at-
tempts, they should be disclosed. And if it isn't aware of any merger plans, it should
explain why it is proposing the changes at that time.
-Existing provisions that discourage takeovers and whether the new proposals are
part of a series of proposals that would tend to insulate the company from an acquisition.
-How the proposals would work.
-Whether the board voted on the proposals. Consideration also should be given to
including the reasons any directors dissented if the vote wasn't unanimous, the staff said.
Wall St. J., October 18, 1978, at 2, col. 3.
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study that found that cash tender offers that were opposed by manage-
ment had a success rate of only 26.7 percent while uncontested offers
had a success rate of 89.2 percent.1
05
1. Shareholder communications. -- One of the simplest and most
commonly used defensive tactics by target management is direct com-
munications to shareholders urging them not to tender. The basic
thrust of such communications is that the long-run advantages to share-
holders of not tendering exceeds any short-term gain realized from ac-
ceptance of the offer." 6 Management communications typically
emphasize that any poor operating performance is temporary; that
management anticipates increased sales and profits; that the tender of-
fer price is inadequate and an attempt to gain control of the target at
"bargain basement" prices; and that the offeror must think the target is
a good investment or it would not be willing to pay a premium above
market. While management communications are regulated by the Wil-
liams Act, the courts have not found these communications unlaw-
ful.107 Moreover, the Supreme Court has held that an offeror has no
implied right of action to sue target management for damages.108
The usefulness to shareholders of these target management com-
munications is dubious at best. According to efficient capital market
theory, a firm's operating performance and future prospects are already.
reflected in the price of its stock. Similarly, the claim that the target
stock is undervalued and that the tender offer price is therefore inade-
quate lacks credibility. Finally, the frequent assertion that the willing-
ness of an outsider to pay a premium demonstrates that the target is a
good investment ignores the fact that an outsider's willingness to pay a
premium often depends on securing new management.
2 Dividends and stock splits.-Management frequently responds
to a tender offer by declaring either a stock split or a dividend in an
attempt to increase the price of target shares. Stock splits do not alter
the proportionate ownership of the corporation and therefore provide
no economic benefit to shareholders. Nevertheless, stock splits are an
accepted defensive tactic because of the belief that shareholders will be
105. Ebeid, Tender Offers: Characteristics Affecting Their Success, 11 MERGERS & ACQUISI-
TIONS, Fall 1976, at 21, 25.
106. Schmults & Kelly, Cash Take-Over Bids-Defense Tactics, 23 Bus. LAW. 115, 122 (1967).
107. Eg., Emhart Corp. v. USM Corp., 403 F. Supp. 660, 662 (D. Mass. 1975); Gulf& W.
Indus., Inc. v. Great A. & P. Tea Co., 356 F. Supp. 1066, 1071 (S.D.N.Y.), a fd, 476 F.2d 687 (2d
Cir. 1973).
108. Piper v. Chris-Craft Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977).
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confused by the split due to the "frailties of investor psychology." 10 9 In
an efficient capital market, however, a stock split that does not enhance
the value of the firm should not increase share prices. Empirical evi-
dence supports this conclusion. In a famous study of stock splits,
Fama, Fisher, Jensen, and Roll 10 found that increases in share value
after stock splits were attributable to investor confidence about future
earnings rather than to multiplication of shares. Thus, it is highly
doubtful that a stock split in response to a tender offer with no prospect
of increased earnings will affect share prices.
The efficacy of a dividend increase is also far from clear. At the
very least, the firm must have adequate surplus to declare a dividend.
A dividend of less than the premium offered by the offeror may have
little impact, particularly with institutional investors who are likely to
be more interested in capital appreciation than dividends.I 1 More fun-
damentally, dividend increases or decreases by themselves should have
no effect on the value of a firm's securities. As Miller and Modigliani
have demonstrated, 1 2 a firm's earnings, rather than its dividend policy,
determine the market valuation of its securities. Both dividend in-
creases and stock splits are unlikely to raise the value of a target's se-
curities, therefore, absent an increase in earnings. Nevertheless, both
tactics may have-some strategic value in defeating a tender offer. Divi-
dends may deplete the corporation of excess cash that made it attrac-
tive to the offeror in the first place; stock splits may give the target an
opportunity to remove stock certificates from circulation temporarily
and thereby prevent shareholders from tendering during the duration
of the offer.
3. Corporatepurchase of shares.-When a corporation purchases
its own shares (either by open market purchase or tender offer), shares
that otherwise might be tendered go out of circulation. While this tech-
nique is not without risk since a reduction of the outstanding stock also
reduces the amount needed by an outsider to gain control, this risk is
eliminated if the stock can be placed in friendly hands.
Corporate purchase of shares is subject to some federal regulation.
Since management is clearly an insider, failure to disclose material in-
109. E. ARANOW & H. EINioR, TENDER OFFERS FOR CORPORATE CONTROL 246 (1973).
110. Fama, Fisher, Jensen & Roll, The Adjustment of Stock Prices to New Information, 10
INT'L ECON. REv. 1 (February 1969).
111. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 109, at 245.
112. Miller & Modigliani, DividendPolicy, Growth, andthe Valuation ofShares, 34 J. Bus. 411
(1961).
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formation should be actionable under rule lOb-5. 113  Corporate
purchases of stock may also be a manipulative practice violative of sec-
tion 9(a)(2) of the 1934 Act if undertaken only to frustrate a tender
offer.11 4  Finally, rule 13e-l prohibits an issuer from repurchasing
shares during the course of a tender offer made by any other person
unless the issuer has filed an information statement with the SEC.l"5
The propriety of corporate repurchases to maintain control has
also been challenged under state law. A series of Delaware cases,' 1 6
typified by the famous case of Cheff v. Mathes,1 7 have held that direc-
tors can lawfully expend corporate funds to purchase shares at pre-
mium prices during a contest for control provided a "corporate policy"
is at stake. If directors believe in good faith that the outsiders will
change corporate policy to the detriment of the corporation, and do not
merely want to perpetuate themselves in control, stock purchases are
justified.""
As numerous commentators1 19 have pointed out, the distinction
between purchases for policy and personal reasons is virtually impossi-
ble to draw since there will rarely be a case where "the incumbent man-
agement has admitted that it was fighting merely to preserve its
position for its own benefit."1 20 The result is that directors can attempt
to thwart a control bid by purchasing shares with relative impunity if
they document their actions with self-serving declarations about corpo-
rate policy.
4. Corporate issuance of shares.-When a corporation increases
the amount of outstanding stock, it increases the minimum number of
113. E.g., Ruckle v. Roto American Corp., 339 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1964). If no deception is
alleged, however, corporate purchases of stock to perpetuate control are not actionable under rule
lOb-5. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462 (1977).
114. E.g., Crane Co. v. Westinghouse Air Brake Co., 419 F.2d 787 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
400 U.S. 822 (1970).
115. The issuer is also required to transit the specified information to its shareholders. Rule
lOb-13, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-13, (1978), prohibits a person making a tender offer for an equity
security from purchasing such security other than pursuant to the tender offer itself. See E. ARA-
NOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 109, at 236-37.
116. E.g., Cheffv. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964); Kors v. Carey, 39 Del. Ch.
47, 158 A.2d 136 (1960); Martin v. American Potash & Chem. Corp., 33 Del. Ch. 232, 92 A.2d 295
(1952).
117. 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
118. The test is virtually identical to the one used to determine when corporate funds can be
used to pay managements expenses in a proxy fight. See, e.g., Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine &
Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
119. E.g., Israels, Corporate Purchase of lts Own Shares-4re There New Oertones, 50 CoR-
NELL L.Q. 620 (1965); Note, Buying Out Insurgent Shareholders With Corporate Funds, 70 YALE
LJ. 308 (1960).
120. Marsh, Are Directors Trustees?, 22 Bus. LAW. 35, 60 (1966).
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shares necessary to obtain control. Any stock interest acquired by an
outsider in anticipation of a tender offer is also diluted. If the new
stock is issued to parties friendly to incumbent management, the pros-
pect of a successful tender offer is significantly decreased.
Unlike corporate repurchases, the Williams Act does not directly
regulate the issuance of shares. However, failure to disclose that addi-
tional shares have been issued during the course of a tender offer may
violate section 14(e).121 The issuance of shares may also breach fiduci-
ary duty under state law if the purpose of the issuance is to obtain or
maintain control.'22 As in the case of corporate purchases, therefore,
the legality of issuances of shares to thwart control by an outsider turns
on whether management acted to preserve corporate policy or to per-
petuate itself in office, an unworkable test.
5. Institution of legal proceedings.- Targets threatened by a
tender offer often resort to the courts. Whether the underlying claim is
meritorious or not, a lawsuit can be a powerful defensive tactic. As one
commentator has stated:
A lawsuit becomes a focal point for rallying the troops. Ev-
eryone can feel good--"we're doing something. We're hitting
back. Boy, we really have got something there to protect us."
And people will then start to function again in a real way to see
what actually can be done to defend against this tender, which
defense may not be in the courthouse at all.123
Although the possible subjects of a lawsuit brought by a target are vir-
tually endless,124 the two most important are suits for alleged Williams
Act violations and suits for alleged antitrust violations.
Until recently, it appeared that a target company could sue an of-
feror for Williams Act violations and either recover damages1 25 or ob-
tain injunctive relief.126 The ability of targets to sue offerors for
disclosure omissions or misstatements, particularly over such vague
questions as whether the offeror disclosed its future plans, considerably
chilled tender offers. The Supreme Court's decision in Chris-Craft,
however, arguably changes this situation.
In Chris-Craft, the Court held that an offeror could not sue a tar-
121. See, e.g., Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp., 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
122. E.g., Condec Corp. v. the Lunkenheimer Co., 43 Del. Ch. 353, 230 A.2d 769 (1967).
123. Wachtell, Special Tender Offer Litigation Tactics, 32 Bus. LAW. 1433, 1438 (1977).
124. For a list of the wide variety of lawsuits in the tender offer context, see E. ARANOW, H.
EINHORN, & G. BERLSTEIN, supra note 3, at 199.
125. Eg.g, H.K. Porter-Co. v. Nicholson File Co., 482 F.2d 421 (1st Cir. 1973).
126. E.g., Electronic Specialty Co. v. International Controls Corp., 409 F.2d 937, 944-46 (2d
Cir. 1969).
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get for damages to remedy Williams Act violations. A common refrain
in the legislative history of the Williams Act is the congressional inten-
tion "to avoid tipping the balance of regulation either in favor of man-
agement or in favor of the person making the takeover bid."' 27 If the
Court were to hold that a target could sue an offeror for Williams Act
violations, but under Chris-Craft an offeror had no corresponding rem-
edy, the balance would be tipped decidedly in the target's favor. If a
target has no implied right of action to sue an offeror for damages after
Chris-Craft, the efficacy of litigation to redress alleged Williams Act
violations will be considerably diminished.
Case law has diminished the target's ability to sue for injunctive
relief for alleged Williams Act violations in another respect. In Ron-
deau v. Mosinee Paper Corp.,12 the Court held that a showing of irrep-
arable harm was necessary to obtain permanent injunctive relief
against an offeror who had failed to file a timely section 13(d) state-
ment. The Court emphasized that the purpose of the Williams Act is to
provide shareholders with adequate information and not to provide
management with a weapon to discourage takeover bids. After
Rondeau, therefore, it will be significantly more difficult for targets to
obtain permanent injunctive relief against offerors. Even if a court
finds that an offeror has made inadequate or misleading disclosures,
Rondeau suggests that the offeror should be allowed to correct these
omissions or misstatements rather than be subject to permanent injunc-
tion from making a tender offer. While Rondeau concerned standards
for obtaining a permanent injunction rather than the more typical re-
quest for a preliminary injunction, courts have generally allowed offer-
ors to continue their tender offer activities after making required
corrections when preliminary injunctive relief is requested.12 9
Along with alleged Williams Act violations, targets frequently seek
to enjoin tender offers on antitrust grounds. Because the antitrust laws
as currently interpreted condemn a merger of competitors with rela-
tively small market shares under section 7 of the Clayton Act,130 many
tender offers have been open to antitrust attack.
The ability of a target to delay or defeat a tender offer on the the-
ory that it would violate section 7 of the Clayton Act, however, has also
been called into question by recent developments. To obtain injunctive
relief under section 16 of the Clayton Act, a party must establish "loss
127. S. REp. No. 550, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1967).
128. 422 U.S. 49 (1975).
129. See E. ARANOW, H. EINHoRm, & G. BRLTS~mN, supra note 3, at 133.
130. Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
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or damage by a violation of the antitrust laws." The question is
whether target companies facing a tender offer can meet this standard.
If targets must demonstrate that they have suffered antitrust injury
(such as a loss of competitive position) to have standing to sue for in-
junctive relief, 3 ' their task will be difficult indeed.1 32 If, on the other
hand, a target need show only that the tender offer would injure the
public, or that the target itself would be injured in some general way,
standing to sue for injunctive relief would be far easier to establish.
The Supreme Court's recent decision in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo
Bowl-O-Mat, Inc. 33 sheds some light on what showing is necessary to
establish standing. In this treble damages action, the Court held that
private antitrust plaintiffs had to show more than a worsening of their
position as a result of a violation of section 7 of the Clayton Act in
order to recover damages. An antitrust plaintiff must show some con-
nection between the violation and the injury.'34
If Brunswick is extended to suits for injunctive relief, target com-
pany injuries that result from tender offers, such as loss of independent
identity, adverse impact on employee morale, and management preoc-
cupation with the tender offer, are not antitrust injuries and would not
be adequate to confer standing. A more difficult problem is presented
by a claim by target management that target shareholders will suffer
injury in a later divestiture or treble damage action. Under this theory,
target management could argue that bringing an antitrust action is con-
sistent with its fiduciary duty to protect its shareholders. While the ar-
gument has some surface appeal, it is not entirely persuasive. The
presumed desire of management to perpetuate itself in office makes a
claim by management that it is only fulfilling its fiduciary duties by
131. Courts have held that plaintiffs must allege anticompetitive injury in order to have stand-
ing to sue for damages. E.g., Reibert v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 471 F.2d 727 (10th Cir.), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 938 (1973).
132. Missouri Portland Cement Co. v. Cargill, Inc., 498 F.2d 851, 866-67 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 419 U.S. 883 (1974). As Judge Friendly stated in commenting on an antitrust defense
raised by Missouri Portland Cement in response to Cargill's tender offer.
Here again the uninitiated would find it somewhat difficult to discern what "loss or
damage" Cargill's tender offer could inflict on MP [the target company] as a corporation,
as distinguished from its management. A cornerstone of MP's antitrust argument is that
acquisition of control by Cargill would make MP not too weak but too strong.
Id.
133. 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
134. The Court stated that an antitrust plantiff
must prove more than injury casually linked to an illegal presence in the market. Plain-
tiffs must prove antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type of the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent and that flows from that which makes defendants' acts unlaw-
ful. The injury should reflect the anticompetitive effect either of the violation or of an-
ticompetitive acts made possible by the violation.
Id. at 489.
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bringing an antitrust suit highly suspect. Moreover, avoidance of a fu-
ture divestiture or treble damages claim as a justification for an anti-
trust challenge is by its very nature highly speculative and therefore
may not constitute antitrust injury. Any injury caused by divestiture or
a treble damages judgment would be limited to nontendering share-
holders-tendering shareholders have no further interest in the target.
A solution that would avoid enjoining tender offers based on specula-
tive future divestiture or damage actions, while at the same time pro-
tecting the rights of nontendering shareholders, is to allow shareholders
an action against the offeror after the value of their investment has
declined as a result of a successful claim under section 7 of the Clayton
Act. 1 35 This solution has the added advantage of protecting sharehold-
ers who may be injured while at the same time preventing target man-
agement from frustrating the operation of the market for corporate
control.
6. Defensive mergers.-One of the most frequent, and most effec-
tive, defensive tactics is the negotiation of a defensive merger. A defen-
sive merger is a merger of the target company with a company other
than the offeror, calculated to defeat the tender offer. Unlike most
other defensive tactics, a defensive merger actually may benefit share-
holders primarily because of its tax advantages. 136 If the compensation
received by shareholders in a defensive merger roughly approximates
the terms of the tender offer, shareholders may be unwilling to tender
their shares. Since most states require a shareholder vote to approve a
merger, shareholders have a choice between voting for the merger or
tendering their shares. In response to an attempt by management to
effectuate a defensive merger, an offeror may raise the tender offer
price or offer a merger proposal itself. These developments can only
benefit shareholders. Thus, defensive mergers are unique among de-
fensive tactics because they create an auction between the offeror and
other companies interested in merging with the target to the ultimate
advantage of all shareholders.
If management urges shareholders not to tender because of pend-
ing merger negotiations that do not in fact exist, it will be liable under
section 14(e) and possibly also under common law fiduciary principles.
135. The likelihood of a successful § 7 suit has been somewhat diminished by the enactment of
the Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1976). Under the Act, the offeror in a cash
tender offer involving companies of sufficient size must file certain information with the FTC in
order to allow the Justice Department and the FTC to evaluate in advance the offer's antitrust
consequences..
136. E. ARANOW & H. EINHORN, supra note 109, at 258.
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Similarly, management may be liable under federal law if it recom-
mends one offer over another for the purpose of perpetuating itself in
control. 13 7
VI. State Law Remedies for Management Defensive Tactics:
Toward a New Standard of Fiduciary Duty
Federal law does little to restrain the defensive tactics of incum-
bent management. Misrepresentations and omissions in management
statements may be actionable under federal securities laws. The
Supreme Court's decision in Santa Fe Industries, Inc. v. Green,1 38 how-
ever, precludes liability for breach of fiduciary duty for persons who
control a corporation under federal law if there is full disclosure. Thus,
absent some deficiency in disclosure, fiduciary concepts under state law
regulate defensive tactics.
A1. Whether Defense of Control Is a Legitimate Justfication for
Corporate Conduct
Courts usually pay lip service to the notion that management ac-
tion for the purpose of retaining control is a breach of fiduciary duty.
The harder question is whether management should be allowed to use
corporate funds to contest control whenever the dispute is over "pol-
icy." 1 39 Recognition of this policy justification for defense spending, an
approach followed by the Delaware courts, is singularly unsatisfactory.
First, the policy test is unworkable since virtually any management
fight to retain control can be cloaked in self-serving declarations of cor-
porate policy. Second, even if it is assumed that an outsider would
pursue policies harmful to the corporation if in control, it is not clear
that self-interested management should be allowed to thwart a control
bid. Once an outsider gains control, new management has the same
incentive to maximize the welfare of shareholders as any other man-
agement team. If the outsider is in fact a "raider," its conduct will be
subject to sanction under standard fiduciary principles.14° While an
after-the-fact remedy may be more costly than a preventive remedy in
deterring the true raider, it does possess the considerable advantage of
137. Grossman, Faber & Miller v. Cable Funding Corp., [1974-75 Transfer Binder] FED. SEC.
L. REP. 1 94,913 (D. Del. 1974).
138. 429 U.S. 814 (1977).
139. See text accompanying notes 116-20 supra.
140. Brudney, Fiduciary Ideology in Transactions Affecting Corporate Control, 65 MICH. L.
REV. 259, 274-75 (1966).
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not allowing management an opportunity to frustrate legitimate take-
over attempts in the guise of protecting corporate policy.
Apart from its unworkability and the availability of other reme-
dies, the policy test is flawed by an even more fundamental defect. The
policy test amounts to a concession that it is appropriate for incumbent
management to decide for the shareholders who should manage the
corporation. While the efficacy of shareholder voting in the modem
publicly held corporation may be questioned, shareholder voting is cru-
cial in the market for corporate control. Only if shares can be freely
bought and sold will the market for corporate control function effi-
ciently. If management is allowed to engage in defensive tactics that
impede the ability of shareholders to trade their shares, the effective-
ness of the market for corporate control will be severely hampered. Al-
lowing management to frustrate the operation of the market for
corporate control decreases management's incentive to maximize the
return to shareholders.
An additional ground for prohibiting management action in de-
fense of control is the difficulty of determining which shareholders
management is representing.. In most contested tender offer situations,
one group of shareholders is willing to sell while another group is not,
either because of loyalty to current management or the belief that a
better offer will be forthcoming.1 4 1 These two groups of shareholders
have widely divergent interests. For the shareholders who wish to
tender, any management interference is unwelcome, even if there is a
valid corporate policy at stake. Since these shareholders will no longer
have a continuing investment after they tender, 42 they are essentially
indifferent to what new management will do. To represent the interests
of these shareholders, therefore, management should take no action to
frustrate the tender offer.
Allowing management to justify the use of defensive tactics fi-
nanced with corporate funds during a contested tender offer to retain
control by reference to a policy dispute is, therefore, unacceptable. At
first glance, this conclusion may appear to be inconsistent with the
principle that directors can spend corporate funds in a proxy contest to
defend their control. The inconsistency, however, is more apparent
than real. In a proxy contest, the use of corporate funds is justified at
141. See Weiss, Tender Offers and Management fesponsibl&P, 23 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REv. 445,
452-55 (1978).
142. Ifa tender offer is oversubscribed, tendering shareholders may retain a continuing invest-
ment because the offeror will only accept shares pro rata. Shareholders can eliminate this risk,
however, by selling to arbitrageurs or otherwise selling in the market.
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least in theory143 by the policy that the shareholders should be in-
formed when casting their votes. Successful insurgents can also be re-
imbursed by the corporation for their proxy expenses. 44  Once
informed, however, shareholders have the power to exercise their
franchise and determine whether the incumbents or insurgents should
manage the corporation. The precise opposite is true of many defen-
sive tactics employed by incumbent management in a contested tender
offer. Of all the defensive tactics, only shareholder communications
can arguably be analogized to the proxy fight situation as necessary to
inform shareholders. Most defensive tactics in the tender offer context
effectively disenfranchise shareholders, or at the very least dilute share-
holder voting power. If insiders, for example, amend the charter or
bylaws to make the corporation unpalatable to outsiders, or purchase
or issue shares, target shareholders are denied a meaningful opportu-
nity to decide who should manage the corporation. This result is an
affront to the principle of shareholder suffrage where it is most impor-
tant-in the market for corporate control.
B The Problem of Determining When Management Conduct Is
Undertaken for the Purpose of Perpetuating Control
If perpetuation of control is an impermissible justification for
management defensive tactics, the problem becomes determining when
a course of conduct is motivated by a desire to maintain control. It is
necessary, in other words, to ascertain whether management conduct,
ostensibly intended to benefit the corporation, was actually undertaken
at least in part to preserve control. Management, for example, may
issue shares pursuant to a stock option plan or asset acquisition and
claim that any impact on control is incidental to the furtherance of a
legitimate corporate purpose. Similarly, management may institute lit-
igation on the grounds that it will benefit shareholders by preventing or
remedying a violation of law.
When conduct by incumbent management during a contest for
control is challenged, the initial quesiton is whether to appraise this
conduct under the business judgment rule or a stricter standard because
of management's self-interest. Because of competition in the capital
and product markets, the market for corporate control, and manage-
143. The theory justilying expenditure of funds in a proxy contest has been seriously question-
ed. See, e.g., Brudney, supra note 140, at 282. Contra, Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane
Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291 (1955).
144. Cf. Rosenfeld v. Fairchild Engine & Airplane Corp., 309 N.Y. 168, 128 N.E.2d 291
(1955) (a shareholders' voted approved reimbursement).
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ment's desire to maximize its compensation and stature, management
generally has an incentive to act in the best interests of shareholders.
When these pressures are effective, the business judgment rule, which
serves as a quasi-jurisdictional barrier to the second-guessing of man-
agement behavior by the courts, serves a salutory function. 45 But the
congruence of interests between management and shareholders breaks
down in a contest for control. The obvious conflict of interest between
the interests of management, primarily interested in perpetuating them-
selves in office, and the interests of shareholders, primarily interested
in either selling their shares at the highest price possible or participat-
ing in a firm with more efficient management, 1" suggests that the busi-
ness judgment rule is inapposite in a contested control situation.
If the business judgment rule is an inappropriate standard for
management conduct during a tender offer, a prophylactic rule that
prohibited any corporate action that affected control would unnecessa-
rily deprive the corporation of advantageous opportunities. A compro-
mise position is required. Management should be able to take action
that has the effect of preserving its control only if there is an overriding
or compelling corporate purpose to justify the conduct at the time. The
burden of proving an overriding or compelling business purpose should
rest on management in light of their self-interest in retaining control. 147
The recent case of Klaus v. Hi-Shear Corp. 148 presents a good ex-
ample of the operation of the compelling necessity standard. During a
takeover attempt, target management approved, along with other de-
fensive tactics, the formation of an Employee Stock Ownership Trust
(ESOT). Management then donated 30,000 treasury shares to ESOT
and guaranteed a bank loan with which ESOT purchased another
50,000 shares at market value. As a result of this stock issuance, the
tender offeror controlled a smaller percentage of the total stock. The
Ninth Circuit rejected application of the business judgment rule and
held that there was no "compelling business purpose" to justify the for-
145. Manne, Oar Two Corporate Systems: Law and Economics, 53 U. VA. L. Rav. 259, 270-71
(1967).
146. It is conceivable, of course, that some shareholders may have a sentimental or other
noneconomic attachment to incumbent management. Presumably, however, this situation will
occur more frequently in closely held corporations.
147. By contrast, the actions of the offeror in deciding to tender and setting the tender price
should be evaluated under the more lenient business judgment rule. The conflict of interest be-
tween management and shareholders and between the various classes of shareholders that justify a
higher standard for target management are absent in the case of the offeror. Thus the actions of
the offeror should not come under any greater scrutiny than the normal corporate decision typi-
cally entrusted to managements discretion.
148. 528 F.2d 225 (9th Cir. 1975).
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mation of ESOT.149
Northwest Industries, Inc. v. B.F Goodrich Co. 150 illustrates the op-
posite judicial approach. In response to an exchange tender offer by
Northwest Industries, Goodrich hastily entered into an agreement with
Gulf Oil, its partner in a joint venture, to purchase Gulfs interest in
the joint venture for 700,000 shares of Goodrich common stock.
Northwest attempted to block the delivery of stock to Gulf on the the-
ory that the consideration paid for Gulf's interest, the 700,000 shares,
was grossly inflated to ensure that a substantial block of stock would be
held by interests friendly to Goodrich. The Court rejected this claim,
holding that the action by Goodrich's management was protected by
the business judgment rule. 51 By failing to recognize the conflict of
interest of Goodrich's management, the Court effectively placed the
burden of proving fraud on the offeror. Under this standard, manage-
ment conduct that has the effect of preserving control will almost inevi-
tably be insulated from meaningful judicial scrutiny.
The compelling business purpose test with the burden of proof on
management is more consistent with the inevitable conflict of interest
faced by management in a contested control situation. Adoption of this
test would subject many defensive tactics to claims of breach of fiduci-
ary duty, a radical departure from much of existing law. Several
courts, for example, have stated that target management has not only
the right, but also the duty to oppose control bids that it does not be-
lieve to be in the best interests of the corporation. 152 By this standard,
the failure to resist a tender offer may constitute a breach of fiduciary
149. Hi-Shear did not suggest any compelling reason why ESOT
had to be established at a time so advantageous to those in control rather than a few
months later when it would not have caused a severe injury to [the offeror]. . . . [T]he
purported business purpose of the issuance of shares to ESOT was not sufficiently com-
pelling to outweigh the unfair advantage to management at [the offeror's] expense.
Id. at 234. The court found that several other stock issuances served a compelling business pur-
pose.
150. 301 F. Supp. 706 (N.D. Ill. 1969).
151. Northwest's tender offer announcement galvanized Goodrich and Gulf to complete
the purchase at this time. Although the officers of both Goodrich and Gulf claim there
was no mutual agreement to defeat plaintiffs takeover bid, there was remarkable empa-
thy between the companies. On the other hand, Northwest appears unable to establish
that Goodrich officials' desire to remain in office was the sole or the primary motivation
for their decisions.
Plaintiff has not shown any likelihood that it can prove that the transaction amounts
to fraud. Considering all factors of value, the persuasive evidence indicates that...
[Goodrich paid] a fair price for Gulf's one half of Chemicals. Goodrich's officers and
directors appear to have been exercising their honest business judgment, so that their
decision is conclusive.
Id. at 712.
152. See, e.g., id.
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duty unless management can justify its inaction. The compelling busi-
ness purpose test would reverse the presumption and require manage-
ment to justify the use of defensive tactics.1 53
VII. Conclusion
The cash tender offer is at present the principal mechanism in our
economy for the transfer of control to those who expect to manage the
assets of a corporation more profitably. The existence of this mecha-
nism gives incumbent management an incentive to perform well and
keep stock prices high, but the incentive is lessened to the extent that
federal and state law hinders potential managers from using the cash
tender offer to gain control. The Williams Act limits the effectiveness
of the cash tender offer by imposing a quasi-fiduciary duty on the of-
feror despite the absence of an insider relationship with the target com-
pany. State takeover statutes contain provisions similar to those of the
Williams Act, but go further to eliminate the element of surprise gener-
ally necessary for a successful tender offer and, in some cases, to let
target company management exercise a great degree of control over the
struggle with the tender offeror. These statutory and regulatory imped-
iments to the smooth functioning of the market for corporate control
serve no valid purpose.
Incumbent managements have also been free, under state corpora-
tion statutes and caselaw governing management accountability to
shareholders, to employ an array of defensive tactics to frustrate tender
offers. Despite the obvious conflict of interest of incumbent manage-
ment faced by an unwelcome tender offer, and the conflict of interest
between different classes of shareholders, courts have typically applied
the business judgment rule in evaluating management conduct. In
some recent cases, however, courts have recognized the inappropriate-
ness of that rule in the cash tender offer context and have required that
153. The extent to which types of defensive tactics would survive the compelling business
purpose standard varies with the particular defensive tactic involved. Courts may draw a distinc-
tion between defensive tactics that have been approved by shareholders and those that have not.
A court, for example, might be justifably reluctant to interfere with a charter amendment ap-
proved by shareholders if management has made full disclosure concerning the amendment's im-
plications. See notes 102-04 supra & accompanying text.
An additional problem faced by courts will be formulating an appropriate remedy for im-
proper management defensive tactics. Shareholders of the target corporation may sue for either
loss of the tender offer premium, waste of corporate funds, or injunctive relief. Offerors may also
be able to sue under state law for the value of the loss of a control block in the target or for
injunctive relief.
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management conduct likely to undermine the tender offer satisfy a
compelling business purpose test. Application of this standard appears
to be the most promising means under present law, absent legislative
reform, to preserve the required vitality of cash tender offers.
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